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ABSTRACT
In this demonstration, we present a privacy-preserving epi-
demic surveillance system. Recently, many countries that
suffer from coronavirus crises attempt to access citizen’s lo-
cation data to eliminate the outbreak. However, it raises
privacy concerns and may open the doors to more inva-
sive forms of surveillance in the name of public health. It
also brings a challenge for privacy protection techniques:
how can we leverage people’s mobile data to help combat
the pandemic without scarifying our location privacy. We
demonstrate that we can have the best of the two worlds
by implementing policy-based location privacy for epidemic
surveillance. Specifically, we formalize the privacy policy us-
ing graphs in light of differential privacy, called policy graph.
Our system has three primary functions for epidemic surveil-
lance: location monitoring, epidemic analysis, and contact
tracing. We provide an interactive tool allowing the atten-
dees to explore and examine the usability of our system:
(1) the utility of location monitor and disease transmission
model estimation, (2) the procedure of contact tracing in our
systems, and (3) the privacy-utility trade-offs w.r.t. differ-
ent policy graphs. The attendees can find that it is possible
to have the full functionality of epidemic surveillance while
preserving location privacy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We are fighting with the pandemic of COVID-19 disease.
To prevent the spread of such a highly contagious virus,
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the crucial information that we need is people’s location
history for epidemic surveillance. Recently, many countries
that suffer from coronavirus crises attempt to access citizen’s
location data to eliminate the outbreak. The US pumped
500 million dollars of emergency funding into the CDC for
building a surveillance and data collection system [1] and
discussed with Facebook and Google for sharing people’s
location data to combat the coronavirus. In South Korea,
the government created a public map of coronavirus patients
using location data from telecom and credit card companies
[4]. Italy’s telecom companies are sharing location data with
health authorities to check whether people are remaining at
home [3]. China’s giant tech companies provide a “health
code” service to certificate a user’s health status based on
her health status and travel history, which are collected by
the cellphone Apps [2]. Although these special measures of
personal data collection for public health emergency may
be temporary and under stringent government regulation, it
raises concerns over privacy, and people are worried that it
may open the doors to surveillance activities in the name of
public health. It also brings a challenge for location privacy
protection techniques: how can we utilize people’s mobile
data to help combat the pandemic without scarifying our
location privacy.
Location privacy has been extensively studied in the lit-
erature [14]. However, the state-of-the-art location privacy
models are not flexible enough to balance the individual pri-
vacy and public interest in an emergency as we are witness-
ing in the COVID-19 crisis. The early studies on location
privacy were extending k-anonymity [16] and were flexible
enough to be adapted to different scenarios such as personal-
ized location anonymity [9]. But the recent studies revealed
that k-anonymity might not be rigorous enough since they
suffer many realistic attacks [12, 13] when the adversary has
background knowledge about the original dataset. The re-
cent state-of-the-art location privacy models[5, 19, 18, 17]
were extended from differential privacy (DP) [8] to private
location release since DP is considered a rigorous privacy
notion. Although these DP-based location privacy models
are rigorously defined, yet they are not flexible and cus-
tomizable for different scenarios with various requirements
on privacy-utility trade-off. Taking an example of Geo-
Indistinguishability[5], which is the first and influential DP-
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Figure 1: Private location sharing with Customizable Policy.
based location privacy metrics, the strength of protection is
solely controlled by a single parameter  to achieve indis-
tinguishability among all possible locations. It is hard to
make a good privacy-utility trade-off using this single  in a
complicated setting.
We should have a flexible and rigorous location privacy
model that enables customizable location privacy policy,
which defines which locations are sensitive, which are not.
The policy should be adjustable for different people, at dif-
ferent time, and with different purposes. For instance, under
the emergency of COVID-19, a location privacy policy for
contact tracing could be “allowing to disclose a user’s true
locations of the past two weeks if she is a diagnosed coro-
navirus patient; otherwise, ensuring indistinguishability of
the user’s location”; if the patient’s location trace and the
time period are confirmed, we can dynamically update the
location privacy policy for each person to find all contacts of
the confirmed patient. A policy for all other people could be
“allowing to disclose a user’s true locations if she has been
stay in the same location at the same period; otherwise, en-
suring indistinguishability of the user’s location” In this way,
we can guarantee both full usability of contact tracing and
reasonable privacy.
In this demonstration, we present PANDA, i.e., Policy-
aware privAcy preserviNg epiDemic surveillAnce, which im-
plements our recently proposed Policy Graph-based Loca-
tion Privacy (PGLP) [6] and mechanisms for epidemic surveil-
lance. Our system is featured by the customizable location
privacy policy graph, which provides a new dimension to
tune utility-privacy trade-off.
In our recent study [6], we proposed a formal represen-
tation of location privacy policy using a graph, which is
inspired by a statistical privacy notion of Blowfish privacy
[10]. In our setting of private location release, a privacy
policy graph (such as the ones shown in Fig.2) includes all
possible locations that need to be protected as its nodes, and
the edges indicate indistinguishability between two possible
locations. A user could arbitrarily customize the location
policy graph according to her privacexy and utility require-
ment and enjoy plausible deniability regarding her where-
abouts. The definition of PGLP can be seen as a general-
ization of two influential DP-based location privacy models:
Geo-Indistinguishability [5] and Location Set Privacy [19].
Under appropriate configuration of policy graphs, an algo-
rithm satisfying PGLP w.r.t. the policy graphs could also
satisfy Geo-Indistinguishability or Location Set Privacy. In
[6], we also designed mechanisms for PGLP by adapting the
Laplace mechanism and Planar Isotropic Mechanism (PIM)
(i.e., an optimal mechanism for Location Set Privacy [19])
w.r.t. a given location policy graph.
However, it is not trivial to directly apply PGLP for a
location-based application such as epidemic surveillance due
to the following reasons. First, it is not clear how to design a
proper policy graph with reasonable privacy and functional
utility. Second, when there are multiple choices for location
privacy policies, we lack a tool to explore and compare the
utility gain w.r.t. different location privacy policies. Third,
it is difficult for users to understand the privacy implications
(i.e., the privacy risks) of a given location privacy policy.
1.1 Contributions
To address the above issues and motivated by the signif-
icant impact of the pandemic of COVID-19 in the world,
we demonstrate a policy-based location privacy-preserving
epidemic surveillance system. Our contributions are sum-
marized below.
First, we design an epidemic surveillance system with
three primary functions: location monitoring, epidemic anal-
ysis, and contact tracing. The scenario is shown in Fig.1,
where users locally maintain location databases (e.g., all lo-
cations in the past two weeks) and share perturbed loca-
tions satisfying PGLP w.r.t. a specific policy graph with a
semi-honest server. The policy graph essentially acts as an
information filter to control what could be shared and what
should not be shared.
Second, we demonstrate three policy graphs with the dis-
tinct granularity that are appropriate for different functions
in the epidemic surveillance. Specifically, we visualize the
utility gain or loss between different policy graphs. It turns
out that no policy could be the best for all. The attendees
of the conference can find that it is possible to have the
full functionality of epidemic surveillance while preserving
location privacy.
Third, we visualize the trade-off between privacy and util-
ity. Although we can specify a policy graph that enables
the full usability of the system, yet it is not clear what is
the privacy implication given a policy graph. The policy
graph itself could be semantically meaningful, but we lack
a quantitative measurement. We provide empirical privacy
metrics as the adversary’s successful inference [15] with an
interactive tool The attendees can randomly generate a pol-
icy graph to explore its effect on the privacy-utility trade-off.
The code is available in github1. A prototype of a mobile
phone App will be available soon.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Location Policy Graph
Inspired by Blowfish privacy[10], we use an undirected
graph to define which location should be protected and which
could not, i.e., location privacy policies. The nodes are
secrets and the edges are the required indistinguishability,
which indicate an attacker should not be able to distinguish
the input secrets by observing the perturbed output. In our
setting, we treat possible locations as nodes, and the indis-
tinguishability between the locations as edges.
Definition 2.1 (Location Policy Graph). A location
policy graph is an undirected graph G = (S, E) where S
denotes all the locations (nodes) and E represents indistin-
guishability (edges) between these locations.
1https://github.com/tkgsn/pglp.
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Figure 2: Two examples of location policy graphs.
Definition 2.2 (Distance in Policy Graph). We de-
fine the distance between two nodes si and sj in a policy
graph as the length of the shortest path between them, de-
noted by dG(si, sj).
In DP, the two possible database instances with or without
a user’s data are called neighboring databases, which can be
interpreted as two nodes with an edge in a policy graph. We
generalize it to k-neighbors defined below.
Definition 2.3 (k-Neighbors). The k-neighbors of lo-
cation s, denoted by N k(s), is the set of nodes that reach s
within k hops, i.e., N k(s) = {s′ | dG(s, s′) ≤ k, s′ ∈ S}.
We define ∞-neighbors as the nodes having a path with s,
denoted by N∞(s).
In our system, we assume that the location policy graph
is determined by the server for the purposed of utility max-
imization. The user has the right to reject a privacy policy
so that no location will be released. By making the policy
graph public, the system has a high level of transparency.
2.2 Privacy Metrics
We now formalize PGLP (i.e., Policy-based Location Pri-
vacy), which guarantees indistinguishability for every pair
of neighbors (i.e., for each edge) in a location policy graph.
Definition 2.4 ({,G}-Location Privacy). A random-
ized algorithm A satisfies {,G}-location privacy iff for all
z ⊆ Range(A) and for all pairs of 1-neighbors s and s′ in
G, we have Pr(A(s)=z)
Pr(A(s′)=z) ≤ e.
In PGLP, privacy is rigorously guaranteed through ensur-
ing indistinguishability between any two neighboring loca-
tions specified by a customizable location policy graph. The
user enjoys plausible deniability about her whereabout.
Lemma 2.1. An algorithm A satisfies {,G}-location pri-
vacy, iff any two ∞-neighbors si, sj ∈ G are  · dG(si, sj)-
indistinguishable.
Lemma 2.1 indicates that, if there is a path between two
nodes (locations) si, sj in the policy graph, the correspond-
ing indistinguishability is required at a certain degree; if two
nodes are not connected (i.e., dG(si, sj) =∞), the indistin-
guishability is not required by the policy. As an extreme
case, if a node is not connected with any other nodes, it
allows to release it without any perturbation.
2.2.1 Comparison with Other Location Privacy
We analyze the relation between PGLP and two influential
DP-based location privacy models, i.e., Geo-Indistinguishability
[5] and δ-Location Set Privacy [19]. We show that PGLP
implies each of them under proper configurations of location
policy graphs.
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Figure 3: System Overview.
Geo-Indistinguishability [5] guarantees a level of indistin-
guishability between two locations si and sj that is scaled
with their Euclidean distance, i.e., ·dE(si, sj)-indistinguisha-
bility, where dE(·, ·) denotes Euclidean distance. Let G1
be a location policy graph that every location has edges
with its closest eight locations on the map as shown in Fig.2
(left). We can derive the following theorem by the fact of
dG(si, sj) ≤ dE(si, sj) for any si, sj ∈ G1 and Lemma 2.1.
Theorem 2.1. An algorithm satisfying {,G1}-location pri-
vacy also achieves -Geo-Indistinguishability.
δ-Location Set Privacy [19] extends differential privacy on
a subset of possible locations, which is assumed as adver-
sarial knowledge. δ-Location Set Privacy ensures indistin-
guishability among any two locations in the δ-location set.
Let G2 be a location policy that is a complete graph among
locations in the δ-location set as shown in Fig.2 (right).
Theorem 2.2. An algorithm satisfying {,G2}-location pri-
vacy also achieves δ-Location Set privacy.
The proofs and the mechanisms for PGLP are presented
in a full version of this paper [6] for interested readers.
3. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
3.1 Epidemic Surveillance
Our system provides consist of three main modules: PGLP
mechanisms, Location Policy Configuration, and Epidemic
Surveillance Apps as shown in Fig.3. PGLP mechanisms
are proposed in [6] for achieving rigorous and customiza-
tion location privacy. It takes inputs of , location policy
graph G and the user’s true location, and outputs a per-
turbed location to the server. The policy G recommended
by Location Policy Configuration and approved by the user.
Location Policy Configuration defines different location poli-
cies according to the application of epidemic surveillance.
Three primary functions (Apps) for epidemic surveillance
are location monitoring, epidemic analysis and contact trac-
ing. Location monitoring focuses on understanding people’s
movement between different cities or provinces in a coarse-
grained level, which provides essential insights when com-
bining with the incidence rate in each city along with the
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Figure 4: Location policy graphs for epidemic surveillance.
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Figure 5: PANDA Demonstration.
people’s movement. It could also provide a “health code”
service, i.e., allowing certification of the users health sta-
tus, in a privacy-preserving way. A location policy for lo-
cation monitoring can be “ensuring indistinguishability in-
side each coarse-grained area and allowing the locations are
distinguishable in different coarse-grained areas” such as Ga
shown in Fig.4 since such a monitor only requires the people
moving between different cities. Epidemic analysis aims at
building a predictive disease transmission model such as the
SEIR model [11]. The fine-grained data would be beneficial
for the estimation of the parameters such as R0 (i.e., basic
reproduction number). A location policy for epidemic anal-
ysis is similar to the previous one, but more fine-grained,
such as Gb in Fig.4. Contact tracing attempts to find all
contacts of a diagnosed case so that to stop the spread of
disease by finding and isolating patients. A policy for con-
tact tracing can be “ensuring indistinguishability only if the
user is not in an infected area, but allowing disclose true lo-
cation if the user accesses an infected location”, which can
be formally represented by a graph Gc in Fig.4. We intro-
duce more details about contact tracing below.
3.2 Demonstration Scenario
We demonstrate the system using Geolife [20] and Gowalla
[7] datasets. Interested readers can find a more detailed con-
figuration in [6]. We provide an interactive tool that allows
the attendees to explore and examine the usability of our
system: (1) the utility of location monitor and coronavirus
transmission model estimation, (2) the procedure of contact
tracing in our systems, and (3) the privacy-utility trade-offs,
as shown in Fig.5 w.r.t. different policy graphs. First, we
evaluate the utility of location monitoring as the Euclidean
distance between perturbed locations and real locations. We
test the accuracy of transmission model estimation using the
difference between (i.e., basic reproduction number) R0 esti-
mated over accurate locations and the perturbed locations,
respectively. Second, we demonstrate the procedure of con-
tact tracing using our system and dynamic policy graphs
(such as Gc in Fig.4). The goal is identifying the people who
have the risk of infection (the decision rule of suspected in-
fection could be advised by CDC or WHO; here we assume
a simple rule of two persons have been the same location
at the same time at least twice). At each time point, each
user sends the perturbed location w.r.t. her policy graph
and stores the past two weeks of location history in a local
database. When the server confirms a diagnosed patient’s
location history, the Policy Graph Configuration module will
update the location privacy policy of the users who have the
risk of infection during the past two weeks (according to our
simple rule). Then, the corresponding user will be asked to
re-send his past location using the updated privacy policy
(the places where the diagnosed patient has been are al-
lowed to be disclosed). In this way, the user can get alerted
and tested in case of infection. Third, similar to the pre-
vious utility evaluation, we will also allow the attendees to
evaluate the empirical privacy that is measured by adver-
sary error [15]. One can choose predefined policy graphs,
as shown in Fig.4, or randomly generate policy graphs to
explore its effect on the privacy-utility trade-off.
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